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I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since January 1959, when Batista's Regime in Cuba was over-
thrown, there has been a steady migration of Cuban nationals into the
United States, most of whom have settled in the State of Florida, particu-
larly in Dade County. These Cuban nationals are mostly political refu-
gees and among the few possessions which they brought from Cuba were
their insurance policies, issued by American and Canadian corporations.
However, in trying to enforce their rights as policyholders, the Cuban
refugees have encountered a solid block of international legal entangle-
ments arising under conflict of laws problems. The typical factual situa-
tion that is present in the cases now before the courts can be exemplified
as follows: X, a Cuban national, bought insurance in Cuba from a
foreign company, the policy being issued from the home office outside
Cuba. After having changed his domicile to Miami, X now brings suit
for insurance benefits. What law should the court apply as governing the
insurance contract?
In this area of the law, the practicing attorney is often unable to
find practical guidelines in the reported cases which will aid him in
prosecuting his case.
II. CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES UTILIZED BY THE COURTS
Originally, in the United States, the federal courts had the power to
promulgate rules covering conflict of laws principles which were gen-
erally accepted and followed by the state courts. Not until the abolition
of this power, as a result of the Klaxon decision,' did the Supreme Court
seriously begin to look for a way to create federal conflicts law by means
other than those precluded by this case. While many insurance com-
panies are incorporated in one state, they nevertheless carry on business
with hundreds of thousands of customers whose residences are in other
1. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elect. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the Court held that
the prohibition 'declared in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) against independent
determinations by the federal courts, extends to the field of conflict of laws and that hence-
forth, the conflict of laws rules to be applied in the federal courts must conform to those
prevailing in the state in which they are located.
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states. It therefore follows, that nine out of ten insurance transactions
contain, by virtue of this incidental fact, a foreign element sufficient to
give rise to conflict of laws questions.'
Standardized insurance contracts, having been drafted by powerful
commercial units and offered to individuals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
are carefully scrutinized by the courts for the purpose of avoiding en-
forcement of "unconscionable" clauses.3 Stipulations of applicable law
contained in the printed policy will generally be ignored by the courts
with the possible exception of cases in which the stipulated law proves
favorable to the insured.' If the lex contractus is discounted as ineq-
uitable or arising because of fortuitous circumstances, and the applica-
tion of the lex fori is avoided so as not to invite undesirable forum
shopping, the law of either party's domicile emerges as a useful alterna-
tive to reach equitable results. However, in many instances the intention
of the parties, as gathered from attending circumstances, is controlling
in determining the place of trial and the governing law. Liability for
the breach of a contract partly performed in one state, and made and
partly performed in another, is fixed by the laws of the state in which
the breach occurred.9 Savigny6 and his school suggest the substitution
of the law of the place where the contract was to be performed for that
of where it was executed. Most jurisdictions in the United States apply
the law of the place of performance without reference to the surround-
ing circumstances. When, however, insurance payments or life rents are
made payable at the domicile of the creditor, his changes of domicile
are decisive.' It should be noted that the renvoi8 concept is generally
foreign to the United States although it has proven useful in property and
divorce cases. In these limited situations, the courts have come to accept
the concept's application.
Other theories of the applicable contract law include the law of the
debtor's domicile and the law most favorable to the contract. In the
United States, preference has been given to the place where the law is
most favorable to the validity of the obligation.9 The law of the insurer's
home office has often been commended as the one most properly respond-
ing to his legitimate interest in the uniformity of contracts. In interna-
tional conflicts cases where selection of an insurer is usually a matter of
2. LENHOFF, CONFLICT AVOIDANCE IN INSURANCE, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 549 (1956).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 346h (Tent. Draft No. 6 1960).
4. The consistency of these holdings may explain the fact that insurance companies
have apparently ceased to use choice of law clauses. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Olin, 114 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 686 (1941).
5. Blair v. New York Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 494, 104 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1940).
6. SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 200-02 (1880).
7. 2 RABEL, THE CoNFLICT OF LAws-A COMPARATIVE STUDY 472 (2d ed. 1960).
8. A doctrine under which the court, in resorting to a foreign law, adopts the rules of
the foreign law as to conflict of laws, which rules may in turn refer the court back to the
law of the forum. 27 YALE L.J. 509 (1918); 31 HARV. L. REv. 523 (1918).
9. 2 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws-A COMPARATIVE STUDY 482 (2d ed. 1960).
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conscious choice, a perfectly workable solution could be developed in
accordance with this suggestion.
The principle of lex loci contractus has exercised a strong hold in
insurance contracts. Under the concept of "contracts of adhesion," 10 it
has been asserted that the law of the place where the standard policy
was drafted should apply, i.e., because the application is on the standard
form of the insurer, the contract is considered to have been completed
by the insurer at his home office. 1' As a rule, an insurance policy is a
contract of adhesion and the courts will consider the terms of the con-
tract strictly against the party choosing them. The strict construction
occurs when the terms of the contract are not the result of mutual nego-
tiations and concessions but rather, are fixed in accordance with a form
to which the insured "adheres" if he chooses, but which he cannot
change. However, in the case of a branch or agency established in a
foreign country, the insurance contracts are generally subjected to the
law of the country in which the branch or agency is located.'2 It should
be noted that the New York courts have refused jurisdiction in a test
case filed against the home office on the basis that the policy was issued
by the branch in Germany to a German resident.'" However, the true
basis for the holding was the overriding public policy. 4
This summary of the different views utilized by the courts in re-
solving conflicts problems would be incomplete without taking note of
the fact that the uncertainty inherent in the principle of lex loci con-
tractus is sometimes welcomed by the courts. When a proposal is sent
from one state to another, or an agent intervenes in transmitting an
order, an application, an insurance policy, or a note, proposed in one
state and sent to another for approval and signature and then returned,
a court may sometimes manage an equitable decision by purposely
locating the place of contract in the desirable jurisdiction. It should be
noted, however, that all international draft proposals have rejected the
lex loci contractus.l5
III. RUSSIAN CASES-THE OLD GUIDELINES
A typical instance in which the courts have been reluctant to pro-
tect the insured's rights, is exemplified by those claims following the
10. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 10 (1963).
11. EHRENZwEIG, CONFLICTS OF LAWS, § 202 (1962).
12. 3 RABEL, TnE CONFLICT OF LAWS-A COMPARATIVE STUDY 327-31 (Ist ed. 1950).
13. "The agency in Germany was established as a distinct entity, a German creation
under German Law. A reserve fund was made and all premiums received were placed in
that fund and invested in Germany under German official approval." Heine v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 50 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1931).
14. The court commented that 28,000 policies in Germany were sought to be enforced
in the United States, thus indicating the underlying interest in preventing the flood of liti-
gation as well as the economic impact which would have resulted had the plaintiffs and
others in similar circumstances been afforded relief. Id. at 383.
15. 2 RABEL, TaE CONFLICT OF LAWS-A COMPARATIVE STUDY 463 (2d ed. 1960).
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Soviet decree of December 14, 1917, pronouncing the nationalization of
Russian companies. 16 The first impulse was to deny recognition to the
Soviet decree on the ground that the government of the forum had not
recognized the U.S.S.R." Some courts held that the legal existence of the
insurance companies was destroyed as a result of the socialization, 8
while others affirmed the capacity of the nationalized insurance corpora-
tion to appear before the courts.'" However, the Russian government
was later accorded diplomatic recognition by the Litvinoff agreement,20
and as a result, the United States government was assigned any claims
that the Russian corporations may have had to properties within the
territory of the United States.2" Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals of
New York held a local branch of a Czarist Russian insurance company
to be in existence, because the strong state control over insurance business
warranted the recognition of the branch as a separate entity despite the
disappearance of the mother company. 2 However, the Supreme Court
of the United States overruled this construction and all other objections
to the extraterritorial effect of the Soviet decrees .2  The theory of the
Court in this instance, which identified recognition of the Soviet govern-
ment with binding recognition of the nationalization decrees, was a re-
grettable deviation from well established principles of international law.
However, recent decisions involving a similar situation in Cuba, have
sought to correct this error.2 4
The Florida courts are presently entertaining multiple suits against
American insurance companies whose assets have been confiscated in
Cuba. In these cases, the defendant companies argue that by virtue of
the nationalization of their Cuban branches, the plaintiff policyholders
could no longer look to the defendant's assets in Cuba for recovery on
their policy, thereby releasing the insurance companies from their obli-
gations to the Cuban policyholders.25 This argument assumes that the
company's Cuban branch is a separate entity from the home office in
the United States and its other domestic and foreign branches. It also
assumes that the policyholders who had purchased insurance policies
16. MANN, The Dissolved Foreign Corporation, 18 MODERN L. REV. 8, 12 (1955).
17. Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 208 App. Div. 141, 203 N.Y. Supp.
232 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
18. M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
19. Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N.Y. 248, 146 N.E. 369 (1925);
Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 211 App. Div. 132, 207 N.Y. Supp. 574 (1925).
20. DEP'T OF STATE PUBLICATION 528; 28 Am. J. INT'L L. 90-96 (1934).
21. 28 Am. J. INT'L L.-Official Documents 10 (1934).
22. Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d
758 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 624 (1940).
23. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
24. Blanco v. Pan-Am. Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963); Confederation
Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 151 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Calvo,
151 So.2d 687 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
25. LAw No. 3 of 1960. See note 32 infra. On this basis, the insurance companies reason
that as a result of the confiscation of their Cuban assets, the Cuban government also assumed
.all of the liabilities arising out of the policies issued through their Cuban branch.
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from the company through its Cuban branch had intended to look to the
Cuban branch of the corporation rather than the home office for pay-
ment under the terms of the policies. The plaintiffs, on the other hand,
contend that it was the intention of the parties that all the assets of the
insurance companies were to be utilized to satisfy payments in accord-
ance with the terms and conditions of the policies.
The insurance companies utilize the Rossia case,2" in which a Rus-
sian insurance company (not a branch of an American firm) had been
nationalized and a creditor filed suit seeking to recover from an Amer-
ican corporation as a transferee of the foreign corporation. The court
held that it was necessary for the plaintiff to exhaust his remedies against
the Russian corporation before proceeding against the transferee on the
theory that the creditor must look to the primary obligor and exhaust
his remedies against him before following the assets transferred. Also
citing the Rossia case, the Cuban policyholders contend that their posi-
tion is distinguishable in that the American home office is the primary
obligor and not the Cuban branch; thus, they are exhausting their rem-
edies through the primary obligor.
Another landmark case is Fred S. lames & Co. v. Second Russian
Ins. Co., 7 in which the plaintiff received contracts as an assignee of a
British insurance company, under which the defendant, a Russian cor-
poration, reinsured the assignor's marine risks. In the action brought in
New York by the plaintiff, the defendant alleged a Russian decree na-
tionalizing its corporation in Russia and contended that by the same
decree, insurance companies, of which the defendant was one, were re-
leased from the payment of debts and liabilities. The court nevertheless
refused to declare the defendant immune from suit, holding that the at-
tempted extinguishment of liabilities is brutum fulmen.8 The same
result would apparently obtain in England as well as in the United States,
even though the government making the attempt has been accorded
diplomatic recognition.29
26. Fred S. James & Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co., 220 App. Div. 404, 221 N.Y. Supp. 739,
aff'd, 247 N.Y. 262, 160 N.E. 364 (1928).
27. Supra note 19.
28. "An empty noise; an empty threat. A judgment void upon its face . . . by which
no rights are divested, and from which none can be obtained, and neither binds nor bars
anyone." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
29. Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N.Y. 248, 146 N.E. 369
(1925). Justice Cardozo speaking for the court commented:
The decree of the Russian Soviet government nationalizing its insurance companies
has no effect in the United States unless, it may be, to such extent as justice and
public policy require that effect be given. We so held in Sokoloff v. National City
Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917. Justice and public policy do not require that
the defendant now before us shall be pronounced immune from suit. In the dr-
cumstances exhibited by this record, we find it profitless to consider whether the
decree was intended to put the nationalized companies out of existence altogether,
or, on the other hand, to preserve them as corporate entities though in the owner-
ship of the government. . . . Our concern is not so much with the consequences
intended by the authors of the decree as with those that will be permitted in other
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With regard to Cuban insurance claims, the plaintiffs have cited
the Second Russian case, arguing that the principal distinguishing factor
is that the defendant companies are alleging nationalization of their
Cuban branch. On this basis, they argue as follows: If it be true that
when the parent business or principal office is nationalized, a claim under
the insurance policy is justified against a subsidiary or branch office, is
it less equitable in a suit against a parent company, for the obligor or
principal office of the company to be held liable under the contract when
only a branch office is nationalized?
IV. CUBAN LAWS
Ever since the Spanish-American war, the dollar was admitted as
legal tender in Cuba and had debt-redeeming force. Cuban Law number
13 of December 23, 194830 provided for the creation of the Banco
Nacional de Cuba and after April 27, 1950, required the withdrawal of
all United States currency from circulation. Presidential Decree number
1384 of April 9, 1951, granted an additional period until June 30, 1951,
for the enforcement of law number 13. It also provided that henceforth
all persons who had contracted obligations in dollars before June 30,
1951, were obligated to make all payments within the territory of Cuba
in pesos at the rate of one peso per dollar. In January 1959, the Batista
Regime was overthrown and Fidel Castro instituted the so-called "Pro-
visional Government of Cuba," which was granted diplomatic recognition
by the United States.
Under Law number 568 of October 2, 1959, the Castro dictatorship
prohibited the export of securities and funds abroad, except by authoriza-
tion of the Cuban Currency Stabilization Fund, and provided the penal-
ties to which the directors and the corporations would be subjected in
the event that they violated the law."' From a practical standpoint, these
jurisdictions where the intentions of its authors are without effect as law. Id. at
251, 146 N.E. at 370.
30. GACETA OFICIAL EX AORDINARIA of Dec. 30 (1948).
31. 10-12 LEYES DEL GOBIERNO PROVISIONAL DE LA REVOLUCION 341 (1959).
PORTIONS OF TEXT OF LAW No. 568 OF SEPTEMBER 23, 1959 (English trans-
lation).
I, Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, President of the Republic of Cuba, do hereby pro-
claim that the following law has been enacted by the Council of Ministers and
approved by me, to wit:
WHEREAS: Title II of Law No. 13 of December 23, 1948, provided for the organi-
zation of the Currency Stabilization Fund, and entrusted it with the fundamental
mission of protecting the national currency on the exchange market, for which
purpose the legislation supplementary thereto broadened the scope of its powers
vesting it with the authority necessary for the regulation of international exchange
transactions.
WHEREAS: During the years in which the tyranny was in power a constant drain-
age of foreign exchange was perpetrated to cover the funds taken away by the bene-
ficiaries of the deposed government, a practice which some interested parties are
still trying to continue through speculation and by deviating the channels of incom-
ing foreign exchange on which the nation depends, or by the remittance of foreign
funds through illegal methods, thereby ostensibly delaying the restoration of our
[VOL.. XVI
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penalties were seldom applied. Instead, all of the corporate assets were
confiscated whenever the law was violated.
By Resolution number 3 of October 24, 1960, the then declared
communist regime of Cuba ordered the expropriation of American enter-
prises in Cuba, including many insurnce companies. 2 Cuban Law num-
monetary reserves and the preferential application of the national resources to the
economic development of the nation.
WHEREAS: It is necessary, therefore, to define clearly and precisely the felonious
acts constituting crimes against the economy of the nation, fixing the penalties
applicable to the different degrees of criminal liability, and to confer upon the
Currency Stabilization Fund and the judiciary the broad powers required for the
protection of the general interests of the Republic.
NOW, THEREFORE: In pursuance of the powers vested in it, the Council of Min-
isters has resolved to enact the following:
LAW No. 568
Article 1.-For the purposes of this law, the following are considered felonies of
monetary contraband:
(6) To export currency or securities, or to transfer funds to points abroad by
means of checks, transfers, drafts, letter-orders, orders of payment, compensations,
travelers' checks, letters of credit, reimbursements of collections, purchases or sales
of passage tickets, or through any other similar means, regardless of the origin or
source of the funds, except for those cases authorized by the Currency Stabilization
Fund, through a member bank or a firm duly authorized by Banco Nacional de
Cuba.
(7) To export or import national currency in excess of the limit that is set
now or hereafter by. the Currency Stabilization Fund.
(8) To establish credits in national currency for persons residing abroad or
for residents of Cuba for the account of residents abroad.
(9) To assign or transfer credits in national currency to residents abroad,
make payments for their account in national currency and set up credits in bank
accounts the holders of which reside abroad, without first complying with the
rules issued by the Currency Stabilization Fund in this respect.
(10) To receive and credit to bank accounts kept abroad, or to transfer to
third parties, collections made abroad for business transacted or services rendered
in Cuba, regardless of the source or origin of the respective funds.
Article 2.-The persons guilty of the felony of currency contraband referred to in
the preceding article shall be liable to a penalty of imprisonment for from 6 months
and 1 day to 3 years, or a fine of one to two thousands cuotas, or both.
If the felony is committed by directors, representatives, officers or employees of
banks, corporations, or artificial person, while acting in pursuance of their functions
as such, the penalty shall be increased from one fourth to one half, in the discre-
tion of the Court, and the firm to which they belong will be secondarily liable
for the cash penalties imposed.
Article 3.-(a) Any person who sells or in any way assigns, transfers or transmits
currency, checks, drafts, orders of payment, travelers' checks or any similar paper
in a foreign currency, shall be liable to imprisonment for from 6 months and 1 day
to 3 years, or to a fine of one to two thousand cuotas, or both.
32. 24-26 LEYES DEL GOBIRNO PROVISIONAL DE LA REVOLUCION 139 (1960).
PORTIONS OF TEXT OF RESOLUTION NO. 3 OF OCTOBER 24, 1960 (English
translation).
WHEREAS: The Imperialist interests whose representatives control the Government
of the United States of North America, in their intention to utilize every means
which they consider effective to impede the consolidation of the Cuban Revolution,
have continued committing aggressions, every day more unscrupulous and criminal,
against the economy of the nation.
WHEREAS: Among the multiple measures adopted by the Government of the
United States of North America, there stands out for its exceptional aggressive-
ness, that of the general embargo on exportations from that country to Cuba with
the intention of strangling our economy.
WHEREAS: That measure in addition to violating the most elemental standards
of international existence, constitutes an act of political coercion with which it
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ber 930 of February 23, 1961, provided that the Banco Nacional de
Cuba would be in charge of the issuance of currency and that any
obligations payable in other than Cuban currency, should be settled by
payment in pesos. Thus, we have seen a sample of the applicable Cuban
laws which will be discussed in subsequent sections.
V. FLORIDA CASES
The case of Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Recio,8 the leading
Florida case in this area, involved an action for a declaratory decree
that the policyholder was entitled to the cash surrender value of a policy
issued by the Louisiana Company and sold to the insured in Cuba. The
insurance company cited the case of Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc'y of United States.4 In Dougherty it appeared that Equitable Life
had qualified to do business in Russia and that it had issued policies in
Russia to Russian nationals. The Russian branches of the American
companies were expropriated by the Soviet government. After recogni-
tion of Soviet Russia by the United States, suits were filed in New York
against the insurer under the policies issued in Russia. The plaintiffs
were successful in the lower courts but in the court of appeals, they
failed. The court in the Recio case commented on the Dougherty deci-
sion as follows:
As we gather the basis for the holding, it is that inasmuch as
pretends uselessly to weaken the popular force of the Cuban Revolution by creating
difficulties in obtaining national supplies.
WHEREAS: It is evident that this conduct of the Government of the United
States of North America reveals the desperation and impotence of imperialism
conducted by that Government; each day with more virulence, to employ the most
unjust aggressions against our country.
WHEREAS: It is the duty of the Revolutionary Government to defend the econ-
omy of the country.
WHEREAS: Moreover, it is fundamental for the liberation and economic develop-
ment of our country that the North American commercial and industrial firms be
liquidated which presently constitute the remainder in our country of the financial
capital of that country.
THEREFORE: By virtue of the powers with which we are vested, in accordance
with the provisions of Law No. 851 of June, [sic, July] 1960.
RESOLVED
FIRST: There is declared the nationalization by means of forced expropriation,
and, consequently, there are adjudged in favor of the Cuban State in full dominion,
all the properties and firms located in the National Territory and the rights and
actions resulting from the exploitation of these properties and concerns which are
the property of natural and juridical persons, nationals of the United States of
America or operators of firms in which nationals of that country have a pre-
dominant interest [including insurance companies].
SECOND: Therefore, the Cuban State is declared subrogated in place and grade
of the natural and juridical person referred to in the preceding section with respect
to the properties, rights and rights of action mentioned, as well as the assets and
liabilities constituting the capital of the concerns referred to.
THIRD: It is declared that these forced expropriations are effected for reasons of
necessity and public use and national interest mentioned in the "Whereas" clauses
of this Resolution.
33. 154 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
34. 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934).
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the contracts involved were Russian contracts payable in Rus-
sia in Russian funds, and exclusively from Russian assets, the
liability could be governed by Russian law. We do not think
that this reasoning is applicable to the present case where the
total assets of the appellant are pledged to the payment of the
contract, and the contract is payable in the United States."5
The court then proceeded to hold that the law of the place of payment,
United States law, applied to this contract, and therefore, the expropria-
tion decrees were not a bar to the action upon the policy.
This holding is closely connected to the modern trend in the act of
state doctrine which started in 1952 with the Tate Letter."6 In this letter,
the Department of State implicitly authorized the United States courts
to determine whether a law of a foreign state is repugnant to the public
policy of the United States and the principles of international law, before
considering its application to the case at bar.
Another leading Florida case is Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde,7
which involved an action by a Cuban insured against Canadian insurers
on a life insurance policy for payment of its cash surrender value in
United States dollars, instead of Cuban pesos. The circuit court entered
summary judgment against the insurer. On appeal, the district court of
appeals held that the Cuban government, in furtherance of its fiscal
policy, could properly make laws which related to currency and legal
tender, and which effectively changed the terms of the life insurance
policy contract from one payable in United States dollars to one payable
in Cuban legal tender at one peso per dollar. As a result of this interpre-
tation, the insurer's obligation under the contract to pay the cash sur-
render value became an obligation to pay in Cuban legal tender. The
court stated:
35. Supra note 33, at 199. (Emphasis added.)
36. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952) (letter dated May 19, 1952) from the acting legal
adviser of the Department of State to the Attorney General. In 1952, the Department of
State, in its Tate Letter, announced that henceforth it would follow the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity when considering requests by foreign governments for immunity
from jurisdiction in United States courts. According to this theory, a foreign sovereign's
immunity from local jurisdiction is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure
imperil) of the state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis), due to increase
in Governments engaging in commerce.
The general tendency of the United States courts is to endorse the jure imperii-jure
gestionis theory of immunity from suit already adopted by many European courts
and by the State Department. The language of the instant case indicates that the
Florida courts, in addition to complying with the trend, may well go even further
by making the restrictive theory applicable to immunity from execution as well as
immunity from suit. 15 U. MIami L. REv. 450, 456 (1961).
See Harris & Co. Advertising v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So.2d 687 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
See also Rodriguez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962); National Institute of Agrarian
Reform v. Kane, 153 So.2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); Berlanti Constr. Co. v. Republic of
Cuba, 145 So.2d 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
37. 151 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
1963]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
In the instant case, the Defendant asserted as a defense its
right to pay in Cuban pesos at par and the allegation of the in-
sured to accept payment in such form, as provided for in the
insurance contract as modified by the laws and executive de-
crees of Cuba. The trial court rejected the defense. In so doing
the trial court erred and deprived appellant of due process of
law. a8
In order to more fully understand the disparity between the Ugalde and
Recio cases, it is necessary to examine the central arguments asserted
by the insurance companies.
VI. THE INSURANCE COMPANIES' POSITION
A. The Breach of Contract Argument
The defendant companies referred to a statement made by Justice
Holmes that:
an obligation existing under the foreign law ... is not enlarged
by the fact that the creditor happens to be able to catch his
debtor here.89
On this basis, the companies claimed that inasmuch as no demand for
payment was made in Cuba, and they had always been ready, willing
and able to make payment in Cuba, no breach of contract existed and
no cause of action had arisen.
A breach of contract is defined as a failure to perform "what is
promised in a contract."4 The defendant companies claimed that they
contracted to make payments only in Cuba and that the plaintiffs had
no contractual rights to demand payment at any place other than the
one specifically designated in the contract. The insurance companies
alleged that they were therefore entitled to disregard any request for
performance inconsistent with the contract and that tender of per-
formance cannot be challenged if made at the place specified in the con-
tract.41 In answer to this argument, the plaintiffs contended that an ac-
tion based upon an insurance policy is transitory in nature and that the
defendant companies were subject to the laws of the state of Florida,
although the policies were written in Cuba. 42 They also noted the court's
comments in the Recio48 case:
[A] contract of a United States corporation payable in the
38. Id. at 318.
39. Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519 (1926).
40. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 314 (1932).
41. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 484 (1963).
42. Confederation of Canada Life Ins. Co. v. Manuel Antonio Vega y Arminan, 135
So.2d 867 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961), cert. denied, 144 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1962).
43. Supra note 33.
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United States in United States dollars cannot be governed by
Cuban laws as to the method of performance.
A fair reading of the policy makes it apparent that an im-
portant provision was that the policyholder might travel to the
United States and that the policy would be paid in the United
States. It must therefore be concluded that the purpose of this
provision was to obligate the American company to pay in
America without regard to the vicissitudes of Cuban law."
Most of the policies sued upon did not specify what law would govern,
but inasmuch as they provided that they would become effective upon
delivery and payment of the first premium, which was made in Cuba,
the defendant companies alleged that this fixed Cuba as the place of
making of the contract.41
The general rule is that unless a contrary intention is expressed in
the contract, matters connected with its performance are regulated by
the law prevailing in the place of performance.46 The very special cases
where.an agreement has been incorporated in the policy, purporting to
waive jurisdiction as to courts other than those of Havana, have been
held not to affect the jurisdiction of the Florida courts.47 Some courts
have held that when the policies do not contain provisions regarding the
exclusive place of payment under the policy, the cash surrender value
can be recovered wherever the insurer has funds.4 Other cases applying
the rationale of the intention of the parties as to the specific place of
performance have denied recovery to the insured.49
It has been held in Florida that claims under policies made in Cuba
should be governed by Cuban law where no significant contacts with the
United States regarding the obligations of the policies exist, so as to
justify or require that the laws of Florida or other jurisdiction, should
govern."0 The defendant companies alleged that while the district court
recognized in the Ugalde51 case that Cuban law should govern, the court
failed to take notice of Cuban Law number 56852 which prohibited the
export of currency or credits by the collection abroad of a Cuban obliga-
tion whether it be directly or through a third party or intermediary "for
business transacted or services rendered in Cuba, regardless of the
44. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Recio, 154 So.2d 197, 198, 199 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
45. Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Lanigan, 154 Fla. 760, 19 So.2d 67 (1944);
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States v. McRee, 75 Fla. 257, 78 So. 22 (1918).
46. Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 48 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1931).
47. Huntley v. Alejandre, 139 So.2d 911 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
48. Buxbaum v. Assicurazione Generali, 33 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
49. Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E.
897 (1934); Kleve v. Basler Lebens-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft in Basel, 45 N.Y.S.2d 882
(Sup. Ct. 1943).
50. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ulgalde, 151 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
51. Ibid.
52. See note 31 supra.
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source or origin of the respective funds." 53 On this basis, the defendant
companies argued that under established conflict ofrlaws rules the courts
of Florida must recognize that the law of the country controlling per-
formance of the contract has prohibited performance in the manner
sought by the plaintiff,54 and that under Cuban law, a cause of action
could not give rise to the right to collect dollars abroad, since the col-
lection was prohibited by Cuban law.
The plaintiffs on the other hand submitted that their claims were
governed specifically by the Florida case of Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay.55
This case involved a policy issued by a British company operating in
the state of Illinois. At the time of the application, the policyholder
was a resident of Illinois where the application was signed and the pre-
mium was paid. Subsequently, the policyholder moved his residence to
Florida where the loss occurred. The British company was qualified to
do business in the state of Florida and suit was filed in the federal district
court. The insurance company defended the suit alleging that the stipu-
lation in the policy forbade suit unless it was instituted within one year
of the loss, which provision the court held was no defense because a
Florida statute5 - prohibits such limitations." The court of appeals re-
versed the holding of the federal district court on the basis that the pro-
vision limiting the time in which suit can be brought is a substantial
property right which is protected by the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution, and that a violation of due process would
result from the application of the Florida Statute.57 On appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, the court of appeals was reversed
on the ground that the adjudication of the constitutional issues should
have been reached only after considering whether, under Florida law,
the above mentioned Florida statute was applicable to the case at bar.
Acting upon the recommendation of the United States Supreme Court,
an advisory opinion was requested from the Florida Supreme Court.58
The Florida Supreme Court held that Florida law59 made void any
provisions of an insurance contract requiring suit to be filed within a
period shorter than 5 years, and stated in its opinion:
[I]t is clear that this state's contact with the subject contract
and parties thereto is abundantly sufficient to give a court of
this state jurisdiction of a suit thereon.60
53. Ibid.
54. REsTATEMENT, CoNLCT OF LAWS § 360(1) (1934): "If performance of a contract
is illegal by the law of the place of performance at the time for performance, there is no
obligation to perform so long as the illegality continues."
55. 133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
55a. FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (1961).
56. Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir. 1959).
57. Id. at 527-28.
58. Clay v. Sun. Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
59. FLA. STAT. §§ 95.03, 95.11 (1961).
60. Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735, 738 (Fla. 1961).
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The court then proceeded to" hold that the law of Florida applied and
not the law of Illinois.6
Other jurisdictions have held that the place where demand for pay-
ment is made does not ultimately become the place of performance since
the result would be to give the plaintiff a world-wide option as to the
place of performance and controlling laws.
2
It is also interesting to note the dissenting argument of Judge
Horton in the Ugalde5 decision, holding that the option for payment of
the cash surrender value under a life insurance policy constitutes no
more than a continuing irrevocable offer by the company, and no com-
pleted contract to pay the value exists unless and until the offer is ac-
cepted by the insured in accordance with its tenor and terms. Judge
Horton then concluded that the Ugalde case involved two contracts, the
first made in Cuba at the time of the policy, and the second made in
Florida when the plaintiff accepted the continuing irrevocable offer of
the insurer to pay the cash surrender value of the policy. This latter con-
tract was the one breached by the insurer's refusal to pay and the one
61. Ibid. However, in Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963), the
court of appeals refused to apply the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court and utilizing
constitutional arguments ordered that the district court enter a judgment for the defendant.
62. See cases cited at note 49 supra.
The defendant insurance companies generally argue that to make payment in dollars in
the United States would deprive them of property without due process of law. They cite
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), in which the plaintiff was the assignee of a
contract of insurance between a resident of Mexico and a Mexican insurance company. The
contract provided that no suit might be brought on the policy more than one year after
damage. More than a year after damage, however, the plaintiff brought suit in Texas. His
recovery on the policy was affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court under a Texas statute
voiding contractual stipulations limiting the time for suit to less than two years. The United
States Supreme Court reversed. The one-year provision was "an express term in the contract
of the parties by which the right of the insured and the correlative obligation of the insurer
are defined." Id. at 406. Terms could not be modified by the courts of Texas, for nothing
relating to the policy was to be done inside of Texas.
Finally, neither the Texas laws nor the Texas courts were invoked for any purpose,
except by Dick in the bringing of this suit.. . . Dick's permanent residence [being]
. . . in Texas [was] without significance [and insufficient to confer power on the
Texas courts] to affect the terms of contracts so made. . . . [the court's] attempt
to impose a greater obligation than that agreed upon and to seize property in
payment of the imposed obligation violates the guaranty against deprivation of
property without due process of law. Id. at 408.
The principle was again applied in Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land
Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934). The plaintiff, a Mississippi corporation, brought suit in that state
against the insurance company on a suretyship contract that had been applied for and
delivered in Tennessee and which was therefore "governed by the laws of Tennessee." Id. at
146. A condition in the contract, valid under the law of Tennessee, absolved the defendant
from liability for claims not made within 15 months after termination of the suretyship.
Mississippi refused to give effect to this provision and held the insurance company liable.
The Supreme Court reversed. The state may not "ignore a right which was lawfully vested
elsewhere, if, as here, the interest of the forum has but slight connection with the substance
of the contract obligations." Id. at 150. As in Dick, the plaintiff's residence at the time of
the suit in the state where suit was brought did not permit that state to overide the rights
vested under another law.
63. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 151 So.2d 315, 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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sued upon by the insured, and since it was made in Florida, Florida law
should control.
The majority opinion in the Ugalde decision made an extended
comment concerning the rights of a sovereign nation to regulate its
currency and monetary agreements. This principle was asserted in
support of the contention that Cuba was entitled to enforce its currency
regulations and that this practice was not in violation of the public
policy of the United States.6
4
American courts under the act of state doctrine65 have been generally
reluctant to pass judgment on the validity of the laws of a foreign state
or the acts of its officials. 6 This doctrine was somewhat relaxed in the
Sabbatino case,67 in which it was held that the act of state doctrine is
one of the conflict of laws rules applied by American courts, but is not
of itself a rule of international law. On this basis, the court held that
when the executive branch of the United States government announces
that it does not oppose inquiry by American courts into the legality of
foreign acts, an exception arises to the judicial abnegation required
by the act of state doctrine.6 8
In the recent Kane6 decision, which involved citizens of the United
States who stated that they were the holders of a majority of the stock
in a Cuban corporation, suit was brought against an arm of the govern-
ment of Cuba as the defendant. The Florida district court refused to
extend the Sabbatino decision and held that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity applied, and that to declare invalid an act of expropriation
by the Cuban government, because the act was confiscatory, would be
a denial of the sovereignty of a foreign state. However, in another
recent decision7 1 the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit,
held that the act of state doctrine does not compel the United States
courts to give force and effect to decrees of the Cuban government which
would have the effect of erasing any rights which Cuban refugees would
have to monies which might be due them under contracts with American
citizens. Neither the Bretton-Woods Monetary Agreement 71 nor the
64. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 151 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). See also
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
294 U.S. 240 (1935).
65. Bayitch, International Law, 16 U. MIAMi L. REV. 240, 271 (1961).
66. Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Frbres Socit6 Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). The
"involuntary novation" theory was maintained in Tillman v. National City Bank, 118 F.2d
631 (2d Cir. 1941).
67. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
68. Ibid. See also the well-known Tate Letter, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
69. National Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Kane, 153 So.2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
Contra, Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So.2d 687 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1961), 15 U. MiAmI L. REV. 450 (1961). See also Bayitch, International Law, 16 U. MwIA
L. REv. 240, 266 (1961).
70. Rodriguez v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962).
71. See note 74 infra.
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Cuban currency control statutes72 could preclude suit by Cuban refugees
against a Louisiana insurer for a declaration that they were entitled to
receive the cash surrender value of certain policies, although the insurer
had asserted that the policies were governed by Cuban law.73
B. The International Monetary Fund Argument
One of the basic arguments of the insurance companies is that under
the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, the de-
fendant has a right to rely on the Cuban exchange laws and that to deny
the effectiveness of the exchange laws would impair the obligations of
the United States under this treaty.74 The courts in the United States
have recognized that positive effect must be given to article VIII, section
2(b) of the International Monetary Fund Agreement. 75 The defendant
companies have alleged:
(1) The Cuban Exchange Control regulations applicable to the
instant case are imposed consistently with the above mentioned
Fund Agreement.
(2) The insurance policies sought to be enforced by the plaintiff's
are exchange contracts within the meaning of the Fund Agree-
ment.
71
72. See note 31 supra.
73. Rodriguez v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962).
74. Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501. The International Monetary Fund
Agreement is a treaty to which the United States, Canada and Cuba are parties. Art. VIII,
§ 2 of the Agreement provides:
(a) [N]o member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on
the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions.
(b) Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are
contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed
consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any
member.
Congress has provided by express statutory enactment that the first sentence of Art.
VIII, § 2(b) of the Fund Agreement shall have "full force and effect in the United States."
59 Stat. 516 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 286(h) (1946). The purpose of the enactment was to give
effect to that portion of the fund agreement which provides that when other mem-
ber countries have exchanged controls which are consistent with the articles of
agreement, United States courts will not enforce exchange contracts that violate
such controls. H.R. Rep. No. 629 (79th Cong., 1st Sess.) 70 (1945); S. Rep. No.
452 (79th Cong., 1st Sess.) 28 (1945).
75. In re Sik's Estate, 205 Misc. 715, 129 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Surr. Ct. 1954) ; see South-
western Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank, 6 N.Y.2d 454, 190 N.Y.S.2d 352, cert. denied,
361 U.S. 895 (1959); cf. Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y. 553,
110 N.E.2d 6 (1953). In Brill v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 14 App. Div. 2d 852, 220 N.Y.S.2d
903 (1961), the appellate division reversed the judgment of the trial court awarding recovery
on a check, payment of which the defendant alleged to be in violation of the Cuban
exchange control regulations. And the case was remanded for trial. A dissenting opinion
pointed out that a summary judgment should have been granted for the defendant due to
the illegality of the transaction as being in contravention of the exchange regulations of
Cuba, and thus in violation of the Fund Agreement.
76. In support of this contention the insurance companies have referred to an article
by Meyer, Recognition of Exchange Controls After the International Monetary Fund Agree-
ment, 62 YALE L.J. 867, 887 (1953), which comments:
That the term "exchange contracts," as used in Article VIII, Section 2(b), means
transactions having their basis in contract and involving exchange, whether of cur-
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For these reasons the defendant companies have claimed that an
insurance policy is an express contract, and that after 1951, all payments
of premiums were made in pesos, making the contract a peso obligation.
They then argued that the plaintiff's attempt to recover dollars outside
of Cuba would result in an exchange of currency. They also asserted
that the determination of the character of the contract is dependent on
the nature of its performance (payment of monies) and not on its original
purpose at the time of contracting 77 (insurance against risk).
The companies have also stated that the primary function of an
insurance contract is the rendering of a service and that the premium
payment is one for current services within the definition of article
XIX(i).78 It has been claimed that the cash surrender value of a policy
represents not a payment for a service, but a repayment of premium
deposits much like an ordinary savings account, which is the most
obvious kind of capital asset. Also, that its transfer from one country
to another involves an international capital movement. Therefore, the
transfer from one country to another of the savings portion of an insur-
ance policy, in this case the cash surrender value, is a similar international
capital movement and that the transfer is subject to the control of the
Cuban Currency Stabilization Fund. The plaintiffs' reply to this argu-
ment was that an insurance policy is transitory in nature and by its
very terms collectable anywhere. As evidence of this, they have noted that
the International Monetary Fund Agreement argument was not even
discussed in the Ugalde decision of the district court of appeal.79 Judge
Horton, in his dissenting opinion, summarily dismissed the question by
saying that the Cuban acts to which the insurance companies refer
only prohibit the export of currency or securities, or the transfer
of funds to points abroad, and do not attempt by their scope,
inference or implication, to affect funds which may have
already been located abroad or possessed by nationals in other
states.8 0
He then stated that the defendant insurance company was authorized
rency, property, or services . . . . [The contract must be express, but] once it is
determined that such a deliberate contract exists, it does not matter where the
contract was made, whether or not it involved exchange at its inception (provided
only that exchange is involved at the time the question arises), or whether or not
the proceeding in which the question is raised is between the parties to the contract.
77. "One who insures his life with a company of his domicile may find, after emigration,
that payment of the surrender value of its policy cannot be made without a license." Meyer,
supra note 76, at 868.
78. Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, at 1425. Article XIX(i) of the fund agreement gives
examples of current, as opposed to capital, transactions:
(1) All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business,
including services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities;
(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments;(3) Payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depredation
of direct investments;
(4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses.
79. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 151 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
80. Id. at 324.
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to do business in Florida and, as established by prior decisions, 8' if
jurisdiction can be legally obtained, resident aliens may bring suit against
the insurers in the courts of Florida to recover on policies such as the
one involved in the Ugalde case. Judge Horton further commented that
the insurance companies authorized to do business in Florida must main-
tain minimum deposits with trust institutions of 300,000 dollars in
order to comply with the statutes for the protection of policyholders,
and therefore, the defendant insurance company did not have to violate
the laws and decrees of Cuba by exporting currency or transporting
funds from Cuba to the United States. 2
Three months after the Florida district court rendered the Ugalde
decision and the companion case, 3 the court of appeal of Louisiana
rendered a conflicting opinion. 4 In that case, the Louisiana court took
judicial notice of the International Monetary Fund Agreement.85 How-
ever, it would appear from a reading of the purposes of that agreement
that the intention was to promote international trade, and not to place
restrictions on citizens or corporations who had made a private contract,8
except where capital transfers are involved. 7
81. Menendez v. Aetna Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1962); Rodriguez v. Pan-
American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962).
82. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 151 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) (dissenting
opinion).
83. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Calvo, 151 So.2d 687 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), in which the
court simply referred to its previous Ugalde decision as authority for its holding.
84. Theye y Ajuria v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 154 So.2d 450 (La. App. 1963).
The court held that the Cuban law requiring that payments between the insured and the
insurer be made in Cuba, was applicable to the life insurance policy before the court and
that inasmuch as the American branch in Cuba was nationalized at the time the insured
was a resident and national of Cuba, the Cuban government subrogated itself in all of the
rights and duties of the nationalized company and the policyholder could not recover the
cash surrender value of the policy from the insurer in the United States.
85. 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1945).
86. Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501:
Article I. Purposes. The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent insti-
tution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on
international monetary problems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and
to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of
employment and real income and to the development of the productive re-
sources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.
(lii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arangements
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect
of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign
exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.
v) To give confidence to members by making the Fund's resources available
to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity
to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to
measures destructive of national or international prosperity.
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree
of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.
The Fund shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes set forth in this Article.
The last paragraph very dearly points out that decisions in regard to the agreement shall
be governed and guided by the purposes set forth in the article.
87. Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1409. Section 3 of Art. VI-CAPITAL TRANSFERS-
reads as follows:
1963]
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The plaintiffs further contended that the agreement88 specifically
provides that no member shall, without the approval of the fund, impose
restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current inter-
national transactions. They further denied that an insurance policy is
similar to an exchange contract.89 The plaintiffs also pointed out that
an insurance policy is primarily a service contract, although it might
also be considered, with regard to annuity policies, as an investment or,
when matured, as payments for depreciation of direct investments-any
of which interpretations would classify the insurance policies as a current
transaction under the agreement. 0
The long established rule is that the primary purpose of life insur-
ance is to insure against the risk of death and while it may also serve as
a savings plan in certain annuity arrangements, the weight of authority
is that a policy or contract for life insurance is an entire, indivisible and
continuous contract in which the risk of death is the predominant
feature.9' Furthermore, the question of divisibility between the death
and savings aspects must rest primarily on the intent of the parties
deducible from the stipulations of the contract and the rules governing
the ascertainment of that intention. 2
On the basis of this interpretation, the plaintiffs have asserted
that an insurance policy is not an exchange contract and does not
represent the purchase of an equivalent amount of dollars. Instead,
an insurance policy is intended solely to insure the life of the party,
and that the exchange value of the currency is never considered. The
Controls of Capital Transfers. Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to
regulate international capital movements, but no member may exercise these con-
trols in a manner which will restrict payments for current transactions or which
will unduly delay transfers of funds in settlement of commitments, except as pro-
vided in Article VII, Section 3(b), and in Article XIV, Section 2.
The central issue in this section could be stated as follows: Whether the effects of a
recovery on an insurance policy issued in the United States but sold to a Cuban national in
Cuba can be considered a capital exchange transfer from Cuba, prohibited under Cuban law,
and whether in that event, the United States courts should, in accordance with the Bretton
Woods Agreement, give extra-territorial application to the Cuban decrees.
88. See note 74 supra.
89. 60 Stat. 1425 (1945). Section (i) of Art. XIX-Explanation of Terms:
Payments for current transactions means payments which are not for the purpose
of transferring capital, and includes, without limitation:(1) All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business,including services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities;(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments;(3) Payments of moderate amounts for amortization of loans or for depreciation
of direct investments;
(4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses.
The Fund may, after consultation with the members concerned, determine whether
certain specific transactions are to be considered current transactions or capital
transactions.
90. Ibid.
91. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933); Robb v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 351 Mo.
1037, 174 S.W.2d 832 (1943).
92. 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 336 (1945).
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plaintiff thus argued in the Ugalde case, 3 that the Cuban policyholder
purchased the policy in Cuba and at that time, had no intention whatso-
ever of exchanging pesos for dollars. His sole purpose was to insure
his life and after the law of Cuba was changed in 1951, payments
continued to be made with no intention of exchanging pesos for dollars,
but to continue the original policy in force. This policy, they contended,
would have been payable in pesos in Cuba if the insured had remained
there, but it became payable in dollars once the Cuban policyholder
transferred his residence to the United States as he was entitled to do
under the terms of the policy. In fact, the plaintiffs pointed out that
the purpose of purchasing insurance is not to receive back an equivalent
amount of the cash paid in but to safeguard against the financial loss
resulting from the death of the insured. Thus, if the policyholder should
die in the initial stages, the insurance company then pays more than was
paid in, and conversely if the insured lives, the insurance company re-
ceives much more than it will eventually have to pay upon the death
of the insured.
Judge Horton in his dissenting opinion in the Ugalde decision 94
cited a New York case95 in which an agreement provided that the plain-
tiff could receive payment in pesos in Columbia, if he so elected, or in
dollars in New York. The plaintiff chose the latter and the defendant
alleged that the foreign exchange control laws of Columbia prohibited
the payment in dollars. The court held that this was not an international
exchange operation and that the control laws did not prohibit the de-
fendant from making payment to the plaintiff in dollars out of funds
available to the defendant in New York. The court further stated that
whether the contract be governed by the laws of Columbia or by the
laws of New York, the result would be the same in that the plaintiff
was entitled to be paid in the currency of his choice.96
In a recent decision of the United States District Court, Southern
District of Florida,97 it was pointed out that the defendant insurance
companies were not required to invest their assets in Cuba except for
an initial deposit of 25,000 dollars, nor was there any indication that
the claims of the policyholders would be paid solely from the insurance
companies' assets located in Cuba. On the contrary, the court found,
as a matter of law, that the total assets of the insurance companies were
pledged to the payment of their insurance contracts regardless of loca-
93. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 151 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
94. Id. at 323.
95. South Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Colombian Petroleum Co., 177 Misc. 756, 31
N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
96. Ibid. On a similar proposition, see Banco do Brasil S.A. v. Israel Commodity Co.,
29 Misc. 2d 229, 215 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Sup. Ct. 1961), in which the court held that the only
provision of the Bretton Woods Agreement which refers to acts of private individuals is
Art. VIII, § 2(b). See note 74 supra.
97. Blanco v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
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tion, as evidenced bythe fact that none of the policies had any restrictions
as to residence, travel, or occupation of the insured. Even the text of
Cuban Law number 13 of December 23, 1948,98 does not show any
indication that it was to have extra-territorial effect.
Judge Choate, referring to the previously mentioned Louisiana
case 99 noted:
The intermediate Louisiana court was not deciding the matter
on Louisiana law, but on its interpretation of the Bretton Woods
Agreement, the United States recognition of the present Cuban
government, and 22 U.S.C. § 286 et seq. Thus, if we apply
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., we come full circle
back to a determination of federal and international law. Un-
mistakably, a federal court sitting in diversity is not bound by
state decisions in interpreting federal questions.
Not only is this court' not required to give recognition to the
described acts of the present Cuban government, but the
Castro decrees have no extra-territorial effect .... We are of the
opinion that neither the persons nor the subject matter of this
action is subject to the sovereignty of the present State of
Cuba. 00
In summarizing, Judge Choate noted that the recent holdings tend to
protect the insureds from the greater power of insurers by means of the
"choice-of-law" rules.' 0 ' Applying this reasoning, the court found that
insurance contracts are governed by the law of the domicile of the
insurers. This view is consistent with the result reached by the Florida
district court of appeal in the Recio case,02 by application of the place
of performance test.
VII. CONCLUJSION-THE PRESENT TREND
Had the Ugalde and Recio cases been before the courts at the time
of the Dougherty decision,0 3 the result might have been in favor of the
insurance companies' position. 4 Today, the act of state doctrine has
98. See note 30 supra.
99. Theye y Ajuria v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., supra note 84.
100. Blanco v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219, 226 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
101. The drafter's comments contained in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 364h (Tent. Draft No. 6 1960), point out that normally the validity of a life insurance
contract is governed by the local law of the state where the insured was domiciled at the
time the policy was issued. However, if the contacts which the contract has with another
state are sufficient to establish a more significant relationship between the contract and the
other state, the local law of the other state will govern. It is significant, that the reason
underlying the choice of law rule is to allow the maximum protection to the insured.
102. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Redo, 154 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
103. Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934).
104. One of the basis for the holding in Dougherty was that since diplomatic recogni-
tion was accorded to the Russian revolutionary government, the court, under the common
law of New York, had to recognize that a foreign state may by its decree, impair, cancel,
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been modified as a result of the communist threat,105 and the executive
branch of the United States government has expressly authorized the
courts to examine the validity of Cuban laws in suits pending before
them.'
It is doubtful that the courts will affirm the holding of the Ajuria
case10 7 and the trend seems to be to consider the Bretton Woods Monetary
Agreement inapplicable to claims under insurance policies issued to
Cuban nationals in Cuba. Even if Law number 568 were applied, it would
affect a "current transaction, '10 8 which is specifically excluded from the
purview of the agreement and in order to be enforceable it would re-
quire that the member nations expressly approve the disposition as
stipulated under article VIII, section 2 (a) .109
It should be noted that whether it be found that the insurance
contracts are governed by United States law from the beginning"0 or
as a result of the exercise of the cash surrender option,"-' or even as-
suming that Cuban law is applicable, the policyholders should be success-
ful at least in claims under insurance policies initially issued by insurance
companies from their home offices outside Cuba. Once the insurer's
liability is admitted, the question of whether payment should be made
in dollars or in pesos, at the rate of exchange of one dollar per peso,
acquires significance. This is especially true when there are involved
policies in which the cash surrender option has not been exercised, since
and destroy the obligations of Russian nationals suing in New York. However, as pointed
out in Judge Lehman's concurring opinion:
We cannot hold that Russian law can relieve the defendant of an obligation for
which it has received payment unless we give Russian law an extraterritorial effect
which under our own law we are not required to accord to foreign law. Id. at 107,
193 N.E. at 910.
However, today the Cuban confiscatory laws have been denied extra-territorial appli-
cation. See notes 67 and 73 supra. The question of how recovery is to be measured is not
the central issue as it was in the Dougherty case. There, the unrestrained inflation rendered
the currency, in which payment was to be made, valueless, and thus made the recovery
in New York, based on the exchange value of the rubles on the day upon which the assured
was to receive payment, equally valueless.
105. See Bayitch, International Law, 16 U. MiAMi L. REv. 240, 271 (1961). See also
material cited in note 36 supra.
106. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
107. Theye y Ajuria v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 154 So.2d 450, 454 (La. App.
1963), in which the court stated:
Cuban Law 568 of September 29, 1959, required payments between plaintiff and
defendant be made in Cuba, regardless of language of the contract. Despite this,
plaintiff attempts to defy the decrees and laws of Cuba, the sovereign to whom it
owed allegiance to come into this country and collect his debt in the currency of
another nation. This would nullify and frustrate his own sovereign's legislative
will and powers.
The court in the Ajuria case found the Monetary Fund argument of the insurance com-
pany most persuasive, since their opinion was in substance an almost exact reproduction of
the insurance companies' argument.
108. See notes 31 and 78 supra.
109. See note 74 supra.
110. See note 102 supra.
111. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 151 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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there is always the possibility that the official rate of exchange might
differ and accordingly affect the amount of recovery. The only possibility
of the insurance companies avoiding total liability is if the insurance
policies are considered exchange contracts controlled by the Cuban
monetary regulations in accordance with the Bretton Woods Monetary
Agreement. This interpretation would indirectly produce the extra-terri-
torial confiscation of insurance policies owned by Cuban nationals residing
in the United States, and would, therefore, be contrary to the public
policy of the United States which provides that all expropriations must
be preceded by adequate compensation in order to be recognized under
the principles of international law.
The extra-territorial application of the Cuban confiscatory laws has
been denied by American courts on the basis of public policy and inter-
national law." 2 Furthermore, the insured's rights to the cash surrender
value under an insurance contract are the same whether civil law or
common law is applied. It was the policyholders' option to accept the
irrevocable offer for the cash surrender value in the United States since
it has been established that an action for the breach of an insurance
contract is transitory in nature. A New York case has held that it is the
claimant's option to request payment in the currency of his choice when
allowed by the terms and conditions of the contract." 8
It should also be noted that Cuban Laws numbers 13 and 568 were
never intended to have extra-territorial application and in this respect
the Ugalde decision should be reversed in accordance with the view
expressed by Judge Horton in his dissenting opinion. This action would
be similar in result to the later Recio"4 and Blanco"5 decisions, which
would avoid the duality of interpretation which later decisions have ex-
hibited concerning the currency in which payment is to be made." 6
112. See notes 67 and 73 supra.
113. See note 95 supra.
114. See note 102 supra.
115. See note 97 supra.
116. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. SoIf Edward KIawans, Civil No. 62-457 (Fla.
3d Dist., September 25, 1963), in which the court stated:
As to the amount of the judgment, if any to be entered upon remand of this case,
it would appear that the amount of said judgment would be controlled by the
principles announced in Confederation Life Association v. Ugalde, Fla. App. 1963,
151 So.2d 315; and in Crown Life Insurance Company v. Calvo, Fla. App. 1963,
151 So.2d 687.
See also Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Raij, 156 So.2d 785, 786 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), in
which the court stated:
The appellant has filed a petition for rehearing, pointing out that, in rendering the
opinion in this cause, the court overlooked and failed to consider its contention
that this transaction was governed by the Bretton Woods Agreement relating to
the International Monetary Fund and the Federal legislation pertaining thereto.
See: 22 U.S.C.A. § 286 et seq. At the time of the original opinion in this cause,
this Agreement was considered and deemd to be not applicable, for the reason that
the contract involved was a contract with an American company, made in the
United States, payable in United States Dollars; that premiums had been accepted
in United States Dollars since 1942, and that the effect of the chancellor's decree
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It is settled law that aliens may institute legal proceedings in any
type of procedure available under the lex ori,"7 as provided by section
IV of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution." 8 Further-
more, the Florida courts have refused to decline jurisdiction under the
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens 9 Thus, "unblocked' 120
Cuban nationals will eventually obtain equitable results in spite of the
complexities of this area of the law.' 2 '
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was only to require the appellant to continue to accept premium payments in
United States Dollars. Not only were we of the opinion that the Bretton Woods
Agreement was not applicable to the contract in the instant case, we were further
of the opinion that the Bretton Woods Agreement pertained only to contracts "in-
volving the currency of any member" of the Fund and that an American contract,
upon which payments were to be made to or by the appellant in United States
currency, was not an unenforceable contract within the provisions of Article VIII,
§ 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement. (Emphasis added.)
117. Bayitch, International Law, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 240 (1961); Bayitch, Aliens in
Florida, 12 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129, 139 (1958).
118. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RiGHTs § 4.
119. Menendez v. Aetna Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1962); Rodriguez v. Pan-
American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962).
120. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 28 Fed. Reg. 6974 (1962).
121. After the completion of this article, the Supreme Court of Florida rendered a
decision in the case of Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, Civil No. 32,780, February 24,
1964, rehearing requested, in which the court held:
The Cuban laws relating to the establishment of currency control are similar to
those which have been enacted in this country with respect to our own currency
and are not violative of United States policy. The Florida Courts are obligated by
the International Monetary Fund Agreement to apply the cited Cuban laws to the
contract here involved.
The petitioner having, upon demand, offered to make payments of the cash sur-
render value of the policy in accordance with the terms of the contract and the
law of Cuba, which governs it, in Cuban pesos in Havana, there was no breach
of contract and no cause of action against the petitioner.
The above decision represents a complete reversal of the apparent trend of the Florida
courts in the instant claims, and when final, many of the questions raised by this article
would have been answered in Florida, since the court has found meritorious both of the
defendant companies' main arguments, i.e., the Monetary Fund argument and the Breach
of Contract argument.
